Security, identity and trust
Trusted Platform Module
A hardware root of trust that holds keys, measures boot and signs attestation evidence.
We design and integrate.
TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification · ISO/IEC 11889
Identity and attestation: a node’s trust module answering a challenge from the verifier. The loop, step by step: 1. A node, its security module and a verifier. 2. Sensor, link, edge and console stand ready. 3. The node boots and measures its own software. 4. Time and place are fixed to every sample. 5. The module signs the measurements. 6. The quote travels to the verifier. 7. The relay forwards sealed packets untouched. 8. Signatures are checked before any model runs. 9. The verifier compares it with the known-good set. 10. The edge releases confirmed results only. 11. A short-lived credential is issued. 12. The console shows the evidence with the alert. 13. The node joins with its credential. 14. Sensors check that the response worked. 15. Record, proof and action are archived together. 16. Everything settles back to idle.
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A node, its security module and a verifier
Nexus Observatory/
Security and trust/
Identity and attestationHardware roots of trust, quotes checked at every join.
Identity and attestation, inside Security and trust: Trusted Platform Module, DICE layered identity, secure device identifiers, remote attestation architecture and more. Every item is traced to its specification, from TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification to ISO/IEC 11889, and runs on the open Observatory Protocol.
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At a glance
Trusted Platform Module
A hardware root of trust that holds keys, measures boot and signs attestation evidence. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds Trusted Platform Module, drawn against TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification and ISO/IEC 11889 and used beside secure elements on the same sites.
问题所在
Hardware roots of trust, quotes checked at every join
Field devices sit in public places, run for years and join networks that also carry control traffic. A single unverified node or unsigned update can reach far beyond the sensor it came with. Security has to be built into how every node joins, updates and reports, because nobody can guard unattended sites in person.
Key facts
- Specification
- TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification · ISO/IEC 11889
- Specification
- IETF RFC 9711 (EAT)
- Specification
- IEEE 802.1AR-2018 (IDevID, LDevID)
- Specification
- IETF RFC 9334 (RATS architecture)
- Specification
- TCG DICE Layering Architecture
Components
- Hardware security module, 1U, in an edge rack
- Fixed gas detectors on a drift wall
- Particulate monitoring station and sensor node
- Overhead line sensor on a distribution span
- Private LTE mast on a solar skid
- “AI tower in a box”
- Data hall row pair with cold-aisle containment
- Operations console with a video wall
Interfaces
- Radio
- Ethernet
- 安全
- PKCS #11 · TPM 2.0
Where it works
- Entity Attestation Tokens
- Remote attestation architecture
In the story below
- The system, part by part
- Assembly
- Installation
- Deployment
- Connections
- 运行
- Failure and recovery
- Scale and federation
- What you get
Scenes · 13
Next steps
Plan a deploymentOpen the Field Deployment StudioSee Security and trustTalk to salesSecurity and trust · Identity and attestation
Hardware roots of trust, quotes checked at every join
Field devices sit in public places, run for years and join networks that also carry control traffic. A single unverified node or unsigned update can reach far beyond the sensor it came with. Security has to be built into how every node joins, updates and reports, because nobody can guard unattended sites in person.
功能
Trusted Platform Module
A hardware root of trust that holds keys, measures boot and signs attestation evidence. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds Trusted Platform Module, drawn against TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification and ISO/IEC 11889 and used beside secure elements on the same sites.
- Specification
- TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification · ISO/IEC 11889
Device identity and attestation
Entity Attestation Tokens
Signed claims about a device’s state carried as CWT or JWT. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds Entity Attestation Tokens, drawn against IETF RFC 9711. We build it into every site for identity and attestation against that standard, and keep its version and its test results on the site’s record.
- Specification
- IETF RFC 9711 (EAT)
Device identity and attestation
Secure device identifiers
Factory-installed and locally significant device identities bound to hardware. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds secure device identifiers, drawn against IEEE 802.1AR-2018 and used beside zero-touch secure onboarding on the same sites.
- Specification
- IEEE 802.1AR-2018 (IDevID, LDevID)
Device identity and attestation
Remote attestation architecture
Roles of attester, verifier and relying party, so trust in a node is evidence-based. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds remote attestation architecture, drawn against IETF RFC 9334. We build it into every site for identity and attestation against that standard, and keep its version and its test results on the site’s record.
- Specification
- IETF RFC 9334 (RATS architecture)
Time and place
When and where, on every record
Every record made for identity and attestation carries its time, from a clock disciplined by satellite time or a PTP grandmaster, with the position and siting record of the station that made it. When time or position degrades, the record for identity and attestation says so, and every user downstream sees the same warning.
Device identity and attestation
DICE layered identity
Device identity derived from each firmware layer for microcontrollers without a TPM. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds DICE layered identity, drawn against TCG DICE Layering Architecture and used beside physically unclonable functions on the same sites.
- Specification
- TCG DICE Layering Architecture
信任
Proved before it is trusted
A node joins a network for identity and attestation only after its hardware root of trust answers an attestation challenge. Its keys stay in secure hardware, its software arrives signed and every record it makes for identity and attestation carries a signature, so anyone downstream can check where a value came from.
证据
Traced to its specifications
We trace each part of identity and attestation to its specification: TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification, ISO/IEC 11889 and TCG DICE Layering Architecture. We keep the versions, configurations and test results of identity and attestation as signed records, so a buyer or an auditor can check what was delivered against what was specified.
- 标准
- TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification · ISO/IEC 11889 · TCG DICE Layering Architecture · IEEE 802.1AR-2018
动态
Updates in rings, with rollback
Software and configuration reach a fleet for identity and attestation in rings: one canary site first, then a few, then all, each ring gated on health and data completeness. A failed gate stops the wave, and each node for identity and attestation returns to its last good release without a site visit.
How it scales
One base unit, repeated
A network for identity and attestation starts with one base node and the instruments it reads. A station adds power and radio, a site adds a relay and a fleet repeats the proven site, so capacity for identity and attestation grows by adding units, never by replacing what works.
What you get
Operational-technology assurance for observing sites
Identity, attestation, segmentation and monitoring for instruments and edge nodes, with evidence for audits. Stated as services, never as a security guarantee. For identity and attestation, it goes to operators of critical sites and agencies as a managed service or professional services, sized to the sites they run.
Talk to salesNext step
Identity and attestation, planned with you
Tell us the sites, the systems identity and attestation must work with and the outcome you need, with a map or a list of addresses if you have one. An engineer replies with a survey proposal, a design and a scope for identity and attestation, and the plan grows from one site to the network you need.
Plan a deploymentOpen the Field Deployment StudioSee Security and trust
More presentations
See it from every side.
Each opens as a full-screen presentation: deeper pages on the same subject, explainers, stories, guided tours of the places, network scenes and the observatories that came before.
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Guided tour · Guided 3D tour Open-pit mineGNSS slope monitors on the benches, a blast seismograph at the boundary and a private cell for the fleet, around a benched pit cut into the ground.Guided tour · Guided 3D tour Transmission corridorLattice towers carry a line across open country; conductor sensors report temperature and sag, and the substation edge brings them into the grid operator’s systems.Network scene · Private 5G · Mining Private 5G in an open-pit mineA private network for haul trucks, drills and slope radar: a mast on the rim, a cell in the pit, the core at the plant, and coverage computed over the benches themselves.Heritage observatories
Heritage observatory · Italy (historic building on the slopes of Vesuvius) · 1841 Vesuvius ObservatoryFounded in 1841 on the slope of Vesuvius, this is the oldest volcano observatory in the world.Heritage observatory · China · 132 Zhang Heng’s seismoscopeIn 132 CE a court astronomer presented a bronze urn that, it was recorded, told the capital of an earthquake no one in Luoyang had felt. No original survives.Interactive tools
Interactive tool · Configure a station Station BuilderConfigure a station part by part in 3D, check the rules as you go and request a quote for the assembly.01概述
Device identity and attestation.
How every node proves what it is and what it runs, how links and keys are protected, how software is traced to its source, how personal data is minimised, and how incidents are found and handled. Each technology below carries what it is, what we do with it, and the standard it is drawn against.
Security, identity and trust
DICE layered identity
Device identity derived from each firmware layer for microcontrollers without a TPM.
We design and integrate.
TCG DICE Layering Architecture
Security, identity and trust
Secure device identifiers
Factory-installed and locally significant device identities bound to hardware.
We design and integrate.
IEEE 802.1AR-2018 (IDevID, LDevID)
Security, identity and trust
Remote attestation architecture
Roles of attester, verifier and relying party, so trust in a node is evidence-based.
We design, integrate and operate.
IETF RFC 9334 (RATS architecture)
Security, identity and trust
Entity Attestation Tokens
Signed claims about a device’s state carried as CWT or JWT.
We design and integrate.
IETF RFC 9711 (EAT)
Security, identity and trust
Secure elements
Tamper-resistant chips that store credentials on constrained devices.
We design and integrate.
GlobalPlatform specifications
Frontier · Security, identity and trust
Physically unclonable functions
Keys derived from silicon variation rather than stored, resisting extraction.
We integrate.
ISO/IEC 20897-1 (PUF security requirements)
Security, identity and trust
Zero-touch secure onboarding
Devices proving their identity to the owner’s network without shared secrets in the field.
We design, integrate and operate.
FIDO Device Onboard 1.1 · IETF RFC 8995 (BRSKI)
02Architecture
Where it sits, and what it speaks.
Identity and attestation draws on the spectrum below; the highlighted layers carry this area, and the protocol functions it speaks are marked.
Device identity and attestation
8
PKI, secure boot and updates
7
Zero trust and network security
7
5G and wireless security
6
OT security and software supply chain
9
隐私与数据保护
7
Keys, cryptography and post-quantum migration
9
Monitoring, incident response and governance
8
01加入 Identity, attestation quote, signed policy.
02Admit Admitted for a stated scope, nothing wider.
03描述 What, where, how and by whom, with calibration.
04Time One clock across the grid, with its error bound.
05Observe Every value with quality and provenance.
06Qualify Tested against the specification, state on record.
07Federate Signed exchange across grids and trust domains.
08Orchestrate Software and configuration by signed plan.
09Correct A correction marks what depends on it and publishes a new version.
10Exchange Products reach people and applications through versioned interfaces.
11Prove Signed proof receipts that an independent verifier can check.
12Exit and decommission An open exit path, and a record that closes.
03On the grid
Every site joins one observing grid.
The open networks on the grid today, over real relief and the geodesic cells we count them into. A site built here enrols into the same grid.
The observing grid
- Open instruments on the observing grid.
04In the field
Where this runs, sector by sector.
Deployment scenarios from the sector research that rely on identity and attestation.
Defence-adjacent (civil dual-use)Critical-infrastructure resilience sensing
Utility and pipeline monitoring under grid-security rules.Government and public safetyNational GBON surface and upper-air network
WMO-grade stations reporting through WIS 2.0, funded through the systematic-observations financing pathway.Government and public safetyWildfire camera network and fire-weather stations
Camera towers with edge inference and co-located fire-weather stations, utility- or agency-funded.Government and public safetyUrban street-flood sensor network
Open-hardware depth sensors with open data and alerts to emergency management.Government and public safetyAlerting integration with the Common Alerting Protocol and cell broadcast
Software-heavy: sensor triggers feed an alert origination tool; the alert authority keeps every decision.Government and public safetyDeployable communications and sensing for incident command
A cell on wheels with satellite backhaul, mesh telemetry and environment nodes at the incident base.05Open and enterprise
Open by default. Enterprise by contract.
The open counterpart lives on the main site for anyone to read and run. The enterprise service is designed, deployed and operated with you, under contract.
Open, on the main site
- Threat model for observing sites
- Attestation profile in the protocol
Enterprise, on this site
- Operational-technology assurance
- Security monitoring for observing sites
- Key and PKI operations
06The rest of the line
Security and trust, area by area.
Security and trustKeys and PKI
Issuance, rotation and post-quantum migration.Security and trustSegmentation and zero trust
Least privilege between nodes, tenants and sites.Security and trustOT and wireless security
Field networks, 5G and the software supply chain.Security and trustMonitoring and response
Detect, contain, recover, with the evidence kept.Bring us the site.
Survey, design, deployment and operation for identity and attestation. The form names who receives your details.
Talk to usAsk for a quote