--- title: "Identity and attestation | Nexus Observatory" description: "Identity and attestation, inside Security and trust: Trusted Platform Module, DICE layered identity, secure device identifiers…" url: https://observatory.global/security-trust/identity-and-attestation/ publisher: Nexus Observatory Inc. updated: 2026-11-07 --- Identity and attestation: a node's trust module answering a challenge from the verifier. The loop, step by step: 1. A node, its security module and a verifier. 2. Sensor, link, edge and console stand ready. 3. The node boots and measures its own software. 4. Time and place are fixed to every sample. 5. The module signs the measurements. 6. The quote travels to the verifier. 7. The relay forwards sealed packets untouched. 8. Signatures are checked before any model runs. 9. The verifier compares it with the known-good set. 10. The edge releases confirmed results only. 11. A short-lived credential is issued. 12. The console shows the evidence with the alert. 13. The node joins with its credential. 14. Sensors check that the response worked. 15. Record, proof and action are archived together. 16. Everything settles back to idle. 01 / 16 A node, its security module and a verifier [Nexus Observatory](https://observatory.global/) / [Security and trust](https://observatory.global/security-trust/) / **Identity and attestation** # Hardware roots of trust, quotes checked at every join. Identity and attestation, inside Security and trust: Trusted Platform Module, DICE layered identity, secure device identifiers, remote attestation architecture and more. Every item is traced to its specification, from TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification to ISO/IEC 11889, and runs on the open Observatory Protocol. [Plan with us](https://observatory.global/contact/) Architecture [The protocol](https://observatory.global/protocol/specification/) **Technologies**: 8 **At the frontier**: 1 **Protocol functions**: 4 of 12 **Industries served**: 5 At a glance ## Trusted Platform Module A hardware root of trust that holds keys, measures boot and signs attestation evidence. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds Trusted Platform Module, drawn against TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification and ISO/IEC 11889 and used beside secure elements on the same sites. The problem ### Hardware roots of trust, quotes checked at every join Field devices sit in public places, run for years and join networks that also carry control traffic. A single unverified node or unsigned update can reach far beyond the sensor it came with. Security has to be built into how every node joins, updates and reports, because nobody can guard unattended sites in person. Key facts **Specification**: TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification · ISO/IEC 11889 **Specification**: IETF RFC 9711 (EAT) **Specification**: IEEE 802.1AR-2018 (IDevID, LDevID) **Specification**: IETF RFC 9334 (RATS architecture) **Specification**: TCG DICE Layering Architecture Components - Hardware security module, 1U, in an edge rack - Fixed gas detectors on a drift wall - Particulate monitoring station and sensor node - Overhead line sensor on a distribution span - Private LTE mast on a solar skid - "AI tower in a box" - Data hall row pair with cold-aisle containment - Operations console with a video wall Interfaces **Radio**: Ethernet **Security**: PKCS #11 · TPM 2.0 Where it works - Entity Attestation Tokens - Remote attestation architecture In the story below 1. The system, part by part 2. Assembly 3. Installation 4. Deployment 5. Connections 6. Operation 7. Failure and recovery 8. Scale and federation 9. What you get Scenes · 13 Next steps [Plan a deployment](https://observatory.global/security-trust/contact/deployment/) [Open the Field Deployment Studio](https://observatory.global/studio/) [See Security and trust](https://observatory.global/security-trust/) [Talk to sales](https://observatory.global/contact/sales-enquiry/) 1. Security and trust · Identity and attestation Hardware roots of trust, quotes checked at every join Field devices sit in public places, run for years and join networks that also carry control traffic. A single unverified node or unsigned update can reach far beyond the sensor it came with. Security has to be built into how every node joins, updates and reports, because nobody can guard unattended sites in person. 2. What it does Trusted Platform Module A hardware root of trust that holds keys, measures boot and signs attestation evidence. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds Trusted Platform Module, drawn against TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification and ISO/IEC 11889 and used beside secure elements on the same sites. SpecificationTCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification · ISO/IEC 11889 3. Device identity and attestation Entity Attestation Tokens Signed claims about a device's state carried as CWT or JWT. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds Entity Attestation Tokens, drawn against IETF RFC 9711. We build it into every site for identity and attestation against that standard, and keep its version and its test results on the site’s record. SpecificationIETF RFC 9711 (EAT) 4. Device identity and attestation Secure device identifiers Factory-installed and locally significant device identities bound to hardware. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds secure device identifiers, drawn against IEEE 802.1AR-2018 and used beside zero-touch secure onboarding on the same sites. SpecificationIEEE 802.1AR-2018 (IDevID, LDevID) 5. Device identity and attestation Remote attestation architecture Roles of attester, verifier and relying party, so trust in a node is evidence-based. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds remote attestation architecture, drawn against IETF RFC 9334. We build it into every site for identity and attestation against that standard, and keep its version and its test results on the site’s record. SpecificationIETF RFC 9334 (RATS architecture) 6. Time and place When and where, on every record Every record made for identity and attestation carries its time, from a clock disciplined by satellite time or a PTP grandmaster, with the position and siting record of the station that made it. When time or position degrades, the record for identity and attestation says so, and every user downstream sees the same warning. 7. Device identity and attestation DICE layered identity Device identity derived from each firmware layer for microcontrollers without a TPM. In identity and attestation, part of Security and trust, the device identity and attestation layer holds DICE layered identity, drawn against TCG DICE Layering Architecture and used beside physically unclonable functions on the same sites. SpecificationTCG DICE Layering Architecture 8. Trust Proved before it is trusted A node joins a network for identity and attestation only after its hardware root of trust answers an attestation challenge. Its keys stay in secure hardware, its software arrives signed and every record it makes for identity and attestation carries a signature, so anyone downstream can check where a value came from. 9. Evidence Traced to its specifications We trace each part of identity and attestation to its specification: TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification, ISO/IEC 11889 and TCG DICE Layering Architecture. We keep the versions, configurations and test results of identity and attestation as signed records, so a buyer or an auditor can check what was delivered against what was specified. StandardsTCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification · ISO/IEC 11889 · TCG DICE Layering Architecture · IEEE 802.1AR-2018 10. Updates Updates in rings, with rollback Software and configuration reach a fleet for identity and attestation in rings: one canary site first, then a few, then all, each ring gated on health and data completeness. A failed gate stops the wave, and each node for identity and attestation returns to its last good release without a site visit. 11. How it scales One base unit, repeated A network for identity and attestation starts with one base node and the instruments it reads. A station adds power and radio, a site adds a relay and a fleet repeats the proven site, so capacity for identity and attestation grows by adding units, never by replacing what works. 12. What you get Operational-technology assurance for observing sites Identity, attestation, segmentation and monitoring for instruments and edge nodes, with evidence for audits. Stated as services, never as a security guarantee. For identity and attestation, it goes to operators of critical sites and agencies as a managed service or professional services, sized to the sites they run. [Talk to sales](https://observatory.global/contact/sales-enquiry/) 13. Next step Identity and attestation, planned with you Tell us the sites, the systems identity and attestation must work with and the outcome you need, with a map or a list of addresses if you have one. An engineer replies with a survey proposal, a design and a scope for identity and attestation, and the plan grows from one site to the network you need. [Plan a deployment](https://observatory.global/security-trust/contact/deployment/) [Open the Field Deployment Studio](https://observatory.global/studio/) [See Security and trust](https://observatory.global/security-trust/) More presentations ## See it from every side. Each opens as a full-screen presentation: deeper pages on the same subject, explainers, stories, guided tours of the places, network scenes and the observatories that came before. [All presentations](https://observatory.global/presentations/) ### In depth [Use case **Utility grid-edge private LTE and wildfire weather**](https://observatory.global/use-cases/utility-grid-edge/) [Sector **Industrial**](https://observatory.global/sectors/industrial/) [ISIC section · ISIC B **Mining and quarrying**](https://observatory.global/industries/b-mining-and-quarrying/) [ISIC section · ISIC F **Construction**](https://observatory.global/industries/f-construction/) ### Explainers [Explainer · Industrial **Industrial** Blast vibration at the pit, fire weather at the grid edge, methane at the fenceline and tailings movement from GNSS.](https://observatory.global/industries/infrastructure/explainer/) [Platform **Security and trust** Every unattended node is an entry point](https://observatory.global/security-trust/) [Platform **Sensors & instruments** A number without its story](https://observatory.global/sensors/) ### Stories [Story · Private 5G and AI-RAN **Private 5G with the inference in the radio** A private cellular network gives a site its own coverage, its own security and its own priorities. AI-RAN adds a second idea: the accelerators that run the…](https://observatory.global/stories/private-5g-ai-ran/) [Story · Post-quantum cryptography **Cryptography that outlasts the quantum computer** Data signed today may need to be trusted in 2040. Post-quantum standards were first published in August 2024, and governments have set dates for leaving…](https://observatory.global/stories/pqc-migration/) [Story · Timing and PNT **Time as infrastructure** A 5G cell must hold its phase within 3 µs of its neighbours, ±1.5 µs of a common reference; a synchrophasor’s one per cent vector error leaves room for only…](https://observatory.global/stories/timing-pnt/) ### Places and networks [Guided tour · Guided 3D tour **Open-pit mine** GNSS slope monitors on the benches, a blast seismograph at the boundary and a private cell for the fleet, around a benched pit cut into the ground.](https://observatory.global/environments/open-pit-mine/) [Guided tour · Guided 3D tour **Transmission corridor** Lattice towers carry a line across open country; conductor sensors report temperature and sag, and the substation edge brings them into the grid operator’s systems.](https://observatory.global/environments/transmission-corridor/) [Network scene · Private 5G · Mining **Private 5G in an open-pit mine** A private network for haul trucks, drills and slope radar: a mast on the rim, a cell in the pit, the core at the plant, and coverage computed over the benches themselves.](https://observatory.global/environments/networks/private5g-mine/) ### Heritage observatories [Heritage observatory · Italy (historic building on the slopes of Vesuvius) · 1841 **Vesuvius Observatory** Founded in 1841 on the slope of Vesuvius, this is the oldest volcano observatory in the world.](https://observatory.global/observatories/vesuvius-observatory/) [Heritage observatory · China · 132 **Zhang Heng's seismoscope** In 132 CE a court astronomer presented a bronze urn that, it was recorded, told the capital of an earthquake no one in Luoyang had felt. No original survives.](https://observatory.global/observatories/zhang-heng-seismoscope/) ### Interactive tools [Interactive tool · Configure a station **Station Builder** Configure a station part by part in 3D, check the rules as you go and request a quote for the assembly.](https://observatory.global/studio/builder/) **01** What it is ## Device identity and attestation. How every node proves what it is and what it runs, how links and keys are protected, how software is traced to its source, how personal data is minimised, and how incidents are found and handled. Each technology below carries what it is, what we do with it, and the standard it is drawn against. Security, identity and trust ### Trusted Platform Module A hardware root of trust that holds keys, measures boot and signs attestation evidence. We design and integrate. TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification · ISO/IEC 11889 Security, identity and trust ### DICE layered identity Device identity derived from each firmware layer for microcontrollers without a TPM. We design and integrate. TCG DICE Layering Architecture Security, identity and trust ### Secure device identifiers Factory-installed and locally significant device identities bound to hardware. We design and integrate. IEEE 802.1AR-2018 (IDevID, LDevID) Security, identity and trust ### Remote attestation architecture Roles of attester, verifier and relying party, so trust in a node is evidence-based. We design, integrate and operate. IETF RFC 9334 (RATS architecture) Security, identity and trust ### Entity Attestation Tokens Signed claims about a device's state carried as CWT or JWT. We design and integrate. IETF RFC 9711 (EAT) Security, identity and trust ### Secure elements Tamper-resistant chips that store credentials on constrained devices. We design and integrate. GlobalPlatform specifications **Frontier** · Security, identity and trust ### Physically unclonable functions Keys derived from silicon variation rather than stored, resisting extraction. We integrate. ISO/IEC 20897-1 (PUF security requirements) Security, identity and trust ### Zero-touch secure onboarding Devices proving their identity to the owner's network without shared secrets in the field. We design, integrate and operate. FIDO Device Onboard 1.1 · IETF RFC 8995 (BRSKI) **02** Architecture ## Where it sits, and what it speaks. Identity and attestation draws on the spectrum below; the highlighted layers carry this area, and the protocol functions it speaks are marked. Device identity and attestation 8 PKI, secure boot and updates 7 Zero trust and network security 7 5G and wireless security 6 OT security and software supply chain 9 Privacy and data protection 7 Keys, cryptography and post-quantum migration 9 Monitoring, incident response and governance 8 01**Join** Identity, attestation quote, signed policy. 02**Admit** Admitted for a stated scope, nothing wider. 03**Describe** What, where, how and by whom, with calibration. 04**Time** One clock across the grid, with its error bound. 05**Observe** Every value with quality and provenance. 06**Qualify** Tested against the specification, state on record. 07**Federate** Signed exchange across grids and trust domains. 08**Orchestrate** Software and configuration by signed plan. 09**Correct** A correction marks what depends on it and publishes a new version. 10**Exchange** Products reach people and applications through versioned interfaces. 11**Prove** Signed proof receipts that an independent verifier can check. 12**Exit and decommission** An open exit path, and a record that closes. **03** On the grid ## Every site joins one observing grid. The open networks on the grid today, over real relief and the geodesic cells we count them into. A site built here enrols into the same grid. ## The observing grid 1. Open instruments on the observing grid. **04** In the field ## Where this runs, sector by sector. Deployment scenarios from the sector research that rely on identity and attestation. [Defence-adjacent (civil dual-use) Critical-infrastructure resilience sensing Utility and pipeline monitoring under grid-security rules.](https://observatory.global/sectors/defence-adjacent/) [Government and public safety National GBON surface and upper-air network WMO-grade stations reporting through WIS 2.0, funded through the systematic-observations financing pathway.](https://observatory.global/sectors/public-safety/) [Government and public safety Wildfire camera network and fire-weather stations Camera towers with edge inference and co-located fire-weather stations, utility- or agency-funded.](https://observatory.global/sectors/public-safety/) [Government and public safety Urban street-flood sensor network Open-hardware depth sensors with open data and alerts to emergency management.](https://observatory.global/sectors/public-safety/) [Government and public safety Alerting integration with the Common Alerting Protocol and cell broadcast Software-heavy: sensor triggers feed an alert origination tool; the alert authority keeps every decision.](https://observatory.global/sectors/public-safety/) [Government and public safety Deployable communications and sensing for incident command A cell on wheels with satellite backhaul, mesh telemetry and environment nodes at the incident base.](https://observatory.global/sectors/public-safety/) **05** Open and enterprise ## Open by default. Enterprise by contract. The open counterpart lives on the main site for anyone to read and run. The enterprise service is designed, deployed and operated with you, under contract. Open, on the main site - Threat model for observing sites - Attestation profile in the protocol Enterprise, on this site - Operational-technology assurance - Security monitoring for observing sites - Key and PKI operations **06** The rest of the line ## Security and trust, area by area. [Security and trust Keys and PKI Issuance, rotation and post-quantum migration.](https://observatory.global/security-trust/keys-and-pki/) [Security and trust Segmentation and zero trust Least privilege between nodes, tenants and sites.](https://observatory.global/security-trust/segmentation-and-zero-trust/) [Security and trust OT and wireless security Field networks, 5G and the software supply chain.](https://observatory.global/security-trust/ot-and-wireless-security/) [Security and trust Monitoring and response Detect, contain, recover, with the evidence kept.](https://observatory.global/security-trust/monitoring-and-response/) ## Bring us the site. Survey, design, deployment and operation for identity and attestation. The form names who receives your details. [Talk to us](https://observatory.global/contact/) [Ask for a quote](https://observatory.global/contact/sales-enquiry/) [Nexus Observatory](https://observatory.global/) **Security and trust** . Every node proves what it is. 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